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On the economics of superabundant
information and scarce attention
Andreas Hefti and Steve Heinke∗
This article provides an introduction to the literature addressing
the causes and consequences of limited attention in economics. We
present a simple set-theoretic micro-structure describing the allocation
of attention, and use this framework to explain the central notions of
goal—and stimulus—driven attention mechanisms. After presenting
empirical evidence on limited attention from psychology, marketing
and internet research, we use our baseline setting to discuss a number
of recent contributions featuring some form of limited attention or re-
lated phenomena, such as obfuscation.
Keywords: limited attention; information overload; attention alloca-
tion; salience; perception; informative advertising; rational inattention;
bounded rationality
L’économie de l’information surabondante et de l’attention rare
Cet article propose une introduction à la littérature traitant, en écono-
mie, des causes et des conséquences de l’attention limitée. Nous pré-
sentons une microstucture simple de théorie des ensembles qui dé-
crit l’allocation de l’attention, et nous utilisons ce cadre pour expli-
quer les deux notions centrales en jeux dans les mécanismes de l’at-
tention : l’attention dirigée par les objectifs et l’attention dirigée par
les stimuli. Après avoir exposé des preuves empiriques sur l’attention
limitée empruntées à la psychologie, au marketing et au travaux spéci-
fiques sur les comportement de recherche sur internet, nous utiliserons
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notre cadre théorique pour discuter plusieurs contributions récentes
qui intègrent certaines formes d’attention limitée ou de phénomènes
liés, comme l’obfuscation.
Mots clés : attention limitée, surcharge d’information, allocationde l’attention,
perception, saillance, publicité informative, inattention rationnelle, ra-
tionalité limitée
JEL: D43, D03, L11, L13, L86, C72, C79, M3
In the modern, digitalized economy superabundance of information is an
omnipresent phenomenon. For example, a typical Google search query
such as “Hawaii holiday" generates more than 100m hits in less than one
second, or the Sunday New York Times contains more factual information
in one edition than was available to a reader in all the written material of
the fifteenth century (Davenport and Beck (2001)). Companies spend enor-
mous amounts to influence the stream of information. Sponsored search
advertising – the acquisition of specially marked search-engine links in on-
going online auctions – has become “the largest source of revenues for search
engines" (Ghose and Yang (2009)).
Themain concernwhether individuals or societies can properly handle any
amount of information has been expressed already prior to the Internet age.
Among the first, Simon (1955b) reconsiders the notion of the “rational eco-
nomic man" by emphasizing the existence of “internal constraints", which
account for the fact that an agent faces physiological and psychological lim-
itations to which he must obey, besides economic scarcity as represented
by budget constraints. Together with such limitations a “wealth of infor-
mation" generates a “scarcity of attention" (Simon (1955a)), and managing
scarce attention is viewed as a key issue for success in modern business
(Davenport and Beck (2001)). A by now large literature in psychology, mar-
keting and consumer behavior research documents the importance of lim-
itations on perceiving multiple stimuli for making decisions, storing infor-
mation, planning actions and other mental processes (Pashler (1998)).
This article provides a short introduction to some of the recent approaches
exploring the causes and consequences of limited attention in economics,
with a special focus on what is frequently referred to as stimulus-driven at-
tention allocation, as opposed to the many models featuring goal-driven at-
tention. In simple terms, stimulus-driven (or bottom-up) attention alloca-
tion means that someone’s attention is directed towards certain objects by
external signals (stimuli), such as a flashy link in a web browser (the “pop-
up” effect), an eye-catching placement on a supermarket shelve, or salient
headlines in a newspaper. The abstract essence of this approach is that hu-
man cognition is not entirely self-contained in such that intense or repet-
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itive exposure to external messages may influence what is on a decision-
makers mind at the time of a decision (and what not). In contrast, goal-
driven (or top-down) attention allocation portrays the decision-maker as
having full mental control over her attention process. The essence of this
approach is that while attention is a scarce resource—not everything can be
considered—the decision-maker is aware of her limited attention, and has
means to rationally decide (optimize) which information sources to attend
and which to ignore, prior to making her choice.
Here is an overview of the article. Propelled by the evolution of the In-
ternet and its “Big Data”, the last decade has seen a surge of interest by
economists and choice theorists in limited attention, which was previously
a recurring theme in psychology and the marketing science. If a decision-
maker is overloadedwith information, e.g. a shopper facing endless shelves
of cornflakes or an investor reading through several magazines trying to
identify the ultimate investment opportunity, an attention allocation prob-
lem exists: which items are considered, which not? While the experience of
information superabundance seems familiar from every day’s life, abstract-
ing such situations in terms of a formal model that captures the essence of
the attention problem is far from trivial. When is attention scarce and infor-
mation abundant? If attention is scarce, what is the mechanism governing
attention allocation? Is there a difference between scarce information and
scarce attention that is meaningful to economics?
Perhaps the best witness of the complexity and versatility of the attention
problem is the substantial heterogeneity in thoughts and corresponding
formal models of attention, making it hard for casual readers and experts
likewise not to get lost in the plethora of assumptions and claims made. To
address this problem, we introduce a simple logical structure in section 1
that formalizes a general attention allocation problem by means of some
set-theoretic primitives. This allows us to precisely draw the dividing line
between goal- and stimulus-driven attention at the individual level, and at
the systemic level between economies featuring scarce information versus
scarce attention. Our framework also provides a useful way of organizing
the different contributions on limited attention and related phenomena.
We review some of the empirical evidence on limited attention in section
2, and continue by discussing the causes of attention as a scarce resource,
or equivalently information overload, in section 3. While there are sub-
stantial differences in how attention is formally introduced, it is a com-
monunderstanding that limits on attention are capacity constraints of some
form on the perceivable measure of information. While some contributions
take such constraints as completely exogenous characteristics of individ-
uals (Falkinger (2008); Anderson and De Palma (2012)), they are endoge-
nously determined in other models by decision-makers that adjust their
attention gates as a response to their information exposure (Anderson and
De Palma (2009); Hefti (2012)). A common insight is that attention becomes
a scarce resource, meaning binding capacity constraints, if more informa-
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tion senders find it attractive to enter a market, e.g. because spendable con-
sumer income has increased or broadcasting costs have decreased.
In section 4we review some contributions that focus on the consequences of
limited attention for competition and welfare in market economies. While
some papers take the attention allocation mechanism (assigning mental re-
sources to decision items) as an exogenous feature of the model (Anderson
and De Palma (2009, 2012)), other articles explicitly model the quest for at-
tention as an additional competitive stage in the information age (Falkinger
(2007, 2008); Hefti (2012)).
While the duality between rich information and scarce attention is a com-
mon theme in the aforementioned articles, several other contributions ab-
stract away from the interplay between information (overload) and atten-
tion, and concentrate more on what the consequences of marketing meth-
ods aiming at attracting attention of new customers or at retaining atten-
tion from already captive consumers are for competitive equilibria. We re-
view some articles of this spirit (Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a,b); Ellison and
Wolitzky (2012)) in section 5.
Finally, we present a simple model of goal-driven attention allocation that
exemplifies the notion of entropy-based rational inattention, which is the
standard concept in this part of the attention literature. We conclude with
some general remarks concerning the development of attention theory in
economics.
1 Limited information, scarce information, scarce
attention
To our knowledge, Falkinger (2007) was the first to provide a general equi-
libriummodel of limited attention, thereby also addressing the logical struc-
ture of an economic model featuring information senders, and attention-
constrained information receivers. For a sender (e.g. an advertising firm)
it is important to recognize how many and which receivers obtain its mes-
sages (its “audience”). For a receiver (e.g. a consumer) it matters which
senders she actually perceives (her “membership”). While Falkinger (2007,
2008) concentrates on general equilibrium properties of economies with
limited attention and zero-measure senders and receivers in a determinis-
tic setting, other contributions have emphasized a strategic or stochastic na-
ture of attention-seeking. In the next section we present some set-theoretic
primitives that allow us to compare the different settings through one lens.1
1.1 Modeling limited attention: Set-theoretic primitives
There is a measure ∆ of receivers, which we usually associate with con-
sumers. Let X be a set consisting of n information items. While we gener-
1 Naturally, our setting shares some conceptual building blocks, such as some notion of a
membership or an audience, with Falkinger (2007).
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ally view X as the set of all existing alternatives in some abstract decision
context, many of the subsequent models operate within a product market
environment, which means that X is the set of different (differentiated)
products in a conventional economic sense. Let Xi ⊂ X denote receiver
i’s information set, i.e. the subset of all items that are part of i’s informa-
tion technology. Conceptually,Xi are those items a consumer, in principal,
could observe, but perhaps misses by her limited attention. For example,
we would say that j ∈ Xi, if j is advertised in a magazine that i regularly
reads, or j is indexed and ranked by Google for some given search query
of i.
Scarce attention Let Ai ⊂ Xi denote i’s attention set, i.e. the subset of
items perceived by i.2 Ai is i’s psychologically feasible set, i.e. the set of
alternatives over which i reaches some economic decision. For example,Ai
could be the collection of perceived fragrances or shampoos in a supermar-
ket, and consumer i decides how to spend his budget over these alterna-
tives. We say that i’s attention is scarce if Ai ( Xi.
The sets X , Xi and Ai are elementary descriptive primitives naturally pre-
sent in some form in models featuring limited attention.3 We shall see that
the notion of limited attention is formalized by some form of capacity con-
straint on themeasure of perceivable information inmost of the subsequent
models. Then, attention becomes scarce if the corresponding capacity con-
straint becomes binding, i.e. Ai ( Xi happens if the information set Xi is
“too voluminous” with respect to i’s capacity constraints.
Limited information We say that receiver i has limited information about
X if Ai ( X . Hence limited information can be either caused by scarce in-
formation (but abundant attention), i.e. Ai = Xi ( X , or by scarce attention
(but abundant information), i.e. Ai ( Xi = X or, of course, by both. The
first type of limited consumer information, caused by insufficient available
information, has been extensively studied in economics. In the context of
market economies the most relevant examples of theories on scarce infor-
mation are models of consumer search or informative advertising, and we
review a well-known example of informative advertising (Grossman and
Shapiro (1984)) in section 4.1. An important question therefore is, whether
the cause of limited information has economically meaningful implications,
so that neither type of scarcity is a special case of the other. Empirical evi-
dence on limited attention and related phenomena such as obfuscation as
well as the models covered by this article provide many arguments in fa-
vor of a clear distinction between the two scarcity regimes. Thus a separate
theory for both seems warranted.
2 The attention set broadly corresponds to what has been called consideration set or evoked
set in the marketing science (see section 2), and it coincides with the notion of a membership
in Falkinger (2007).
3 With descriptive we mean that these sets are logically present in models of limited atten-
tion, even if they are not modeled in terms of an explicitly given definition.
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Receiver choice with limited attention A model of limited attention be-
comes interesting by building more logical structure around X , Xi and
Ai, especially by specifying the interdependence of attention sets and con-
sumer demand. Let receiver choice be captured by a (demand) function
di : P(X) → Rn+, where P(X) is the power set of X , and the j-th com-
ponent satisfies dij(Ai) = 0 if j /∈ Ai. That is, di describes what person
i chooses from a given attention set Ai, and only perceived items can be
requested.4
Suppose that the receiver choice process can be described by a stylized com-
posite mapping of the form di◦Pi◦Φi, whereXi = Φi(X) andAi = Pi(Xi).
Themodels on limited attentionwe cover in this article feature a choice pro-
cedure consistent with such a mapping. Its essence is that decisions can be
made only over alternatives that survive two different types of filtering:
• A technological filter Φi, describing which information is available to
receiver i.
• A psychological filter Pi, describing which of the available informa-
tion is actually perceived.
The attention models covered by this article differ with respect to their spe-
cific assumptions on these filters, but they all have in common that limited
attention affects the choice process conditional on Xi, the set of items that
receiver i can, in principal, gather information about.
1.2 Attention allocation
If attention is a scarce resource, then an attention allocation problem exists:
Which items in Xi are perceived and which not? In the following we de-
scribe the individual attention allocation bymeans of a probabilitymeasure
Pi on the measure space (Xi,P(Xi)).5 For any A ∈ P(Xi), the probability
to perceive attention set A is given by Pi(A). Intuitively, Pi specifies the
frequency with which i observes Ai. In this vein, we interpret the function
Pi as the allocation of i’s attention, conditional on Xi.6
Once (Xi, Pi, di) is specified receiver-wise, one can derive a corresponding
attention allocation at the population level. To see this, consider a finite
population consisting of ∆ receivers. Note that we can extend the prob-
ability measure Pi from the measure space (Xi,P(Xi)) to (X,P(X)) by
setting Pi(j) = 0 ∀ j /∈ Xi. Then the population level information set is
4 The assumption that perception precedes choice is of great importance in modern choice
theorywhen attempting to uncover preferences from choice data produced by consumerswith
limited attention (Masatlioglu et al. (2012)).
5 We could e.g. specify a probability measure Pˆi on (X,P(X)), and for (Xi,P(Xi)) set
Pi(A) ≡ Pˆi(A|Xi).
6 This differs from Falkinger (2007), where an attention allocation is an economy-wide de-
terministic assignment of receivers (consumers) to senders (firms).
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⋃
Xi ≡ X˜ ⊂ X , and it is easy to see that P (A) =
∑
i
Pi(A)
∆ defines a prob-
ability measure on
(
X˜,P(X˜)
)
, representing the average frequency with
which attention set A ⊂ X˜ is observed in the economy.
It is important to bear in mind that the objects (X,Xi, Pi, di) are mainly de-
scriptive vessels of the choice process. While we view (X,Xi, Pi, di) as a
natural micro-structure of any limited attention model, there is a plethora
of possibilities how these objects could be (and have been) specified by par-
ticular models. For the objective of this article, they provide a useful and
transparent way of organizing the different contributions.
1.3 An organization of the literature covered
Regarding the individual allocation of attention an important separation
can be drawn between models featuring a goal-driven or a stimulus-driven
attention process.7 In terms of our simple primitives, this boils down to
two fundamentally different ways of how the attention allocation function
Pi could be determined.
“Goal-driven” means that one’s attention allocation is essentially under
one’s own control, and as such a part of a decision-maker’s optimization
process. In terms of our simple primitives this means that Pi is endoge-
nously determined by i’s choice. Loosely spoken, Pi answers questions
such as “Which part of information data should I analyze" (Sims (2003)),
or “How frequently should I update my information about current eco-
nomic conditions in order to optimally adjust my consumption plans” (Reis
(2006)).
In contrast, “stimulus-driven” means that the individual attention process
depends on the strength or conspicuousness of the arriving signals (stim-
uli). For example, such stimuli could be various advertisingmessages broad-
casted over differentmedia, or visual features increasing the salience of cer-
tain information elements such as weblinks (placement, highlighting). In
terms of our primitives thismeans thatPi depends on the attention-seeking
activities of the various senders.
In reality, attention features both goal- and stimulus-driven characteristics.
It is a natural path of science to consider these aspects separately in order
to distill out the essential substrata of each process. One interesting inter-
mediate case, covered in sections 4.2 - 4.4 of this article, is to maintain Pi
as determined by external stimuli, but allow individuals to adapt their “at-
tention spans”, i.e. the measure of signals that trespass the perception gate.
This means that while perception is prone to external signal interference, a
decision-maker may respond to changes in the economic environment by
adapting how penetrable his attention filter is.
Limited attentionmodels: An overview Given the dominant importance
of individual optimization (or self-control) in the notion of most equilib-
7 This dichotomy is also omnipresent in the psychological literature on attention.
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rium concepts in economics, it is not surprising that economics has squarely
focused on goal-driven attention, frequently referred to as models of ratio-
nal inattention. While we discuss rational inattention in section 6 in the con-
text of a beauty contest, we chose to concentrate on contributions dealing
more with limited attention and sender-driven attention allocations in the
main part of this article, as we see this strand as important and still under-
represented in economics.
A common feature of all models covered by this article are stable prefer-
ences, meaning that a change of observed behavior is not attributed to a
change of tastes, but rather to a change in either perception or decision-
relevant economic variables, such as prices or qualities of products. The
papers covered by our article differ in their assumptions about demand di
(economic competition), about how information is quantified to make the
notion of a capacity constraint meaningful and about how the attention al-
location Pi is determined (see table 1). First, some papers introduce limited
attention as a bound on signal volume, while others consider limited atten-
tion as a bound on the measure of perceivable signal sources. Next, some
papers introduce salience competition, meaning that the signal strength of
the messages (their salience) influences whether they are perceived or not,
while other papers take the allocation function Pi as completely exogenous.
Finally, the articles vary with respect to the underlying economic environ-
ment, especially with respect to the form of product market competition, or
whether there is free entry, in which case Xi (or X) are endogenous to the
model.
Table 1: Overview: Models with limited attention.
I II III IV V VI
Volume-based LA + + − − − −
Item-based LA − − + + − +
Endogenous LA constraints − − + − − +
Salience competition + + − − + +
Product market competition − General eq. − − Duopoly Oligopoly
Free entry (info sources) + + + + − +
Indexing: I Falkinger (2007), II Falkinger (2008), III Anderson and De Palma (2009), IV
Anderson and De Palma (2012), V Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a,b), VI Hefti (2012)
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2 Limited attention and stimulus-driven attention:
Evidence
Several contributions on attention covered by our survey have been inspired
andmotivated by the strong evidence on limited attention frompsychology,
marketing science and research on consumer behavior.8 In this section we
summarize some of the main empirical facts of these fields.
Psychology The distinction of attention as an active or passive part of cog-
nition is a core issue in the psychology of attention (see Pashler (1998)). In
this literature it is a central question “whether attention is goal-driven, con-
trolled in a top-down fashion, or stimulus driven, controlled in a bottom-up
fashion" (Yantis (1998)). While both allocationmechanisms are important in
explaining how subjects perform during visual search experiments, much
evidence suggests that “stimulus-driven attentional control is both faster
and more potent than goal-driven attentional control" (Yantis (1998)). Ex-
perimental findings on visual search show that response time of subjects
to a stimulus is flat if few objects are displayed, but increases exponentially
with the number of visualized objects (Mozer and Sitton (1998)). Such find-
ings suggest that capacity limits impose a bottleneck to stimulus process-
ing, meaning that in presence ofmultiple stimuli attention operates as a gat-
ing mechanism by restricting the amount of processed information. Hence
some signals are inhibited, while others are processed on to the recognition
network.9
Related studies emphasize that the “relative salience of a target" is much
more important than “the occurrence of specific features" in explaining ob-
served search time (Nothdurft (2000)). Thus to generate a pop-up or salience
effect the motion, color or luminance of an object matters relatively to the
local and global surrounding of the object. Experimental evidence on the
spatial distribution of attention over the visual field suggests that attention
frequently works as a spotlight. Once a location is selected, all features at
that location are processed and moved on to the recognition network (e.g.
Kahneman and Henik (1981)) or “receive enhanced processing" (Maunsell
and Treue (2006)). In sum, there is substantial empirical evidence that the
relative salience of a target importantly affects the amount of mental process-
ing the object receives, at least in sufficiently complex environments.
Marketing studies While research on the equilibrium consequences of
limited attention is a very recent development in economics, the idea that
consumers reach their decisions conditional on a subset of all possible alter-
natives has a long-standing tradition in marketing, dating back to Howard
8 This is in particular the case for models featuring some form of salience competition, e.g.
Falkinger (2007, 2008), Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a,b) and Hefti (2012).
9 SeeMilliken andTipper (1998) for experiments on the importance of inhibition in selection
experiments.
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and Sheth (1969). Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) provide an overview of
empirical marketing studies dealing with consideration sets. The authors
emphasize that these sets usually are very small compared to the complete
set of possible alternatives. For example, the median shopper considers
about 4 shampoos out of more than 30, or 2 − 5 autos out of more than
160. Interestingly, the average consideration set size varies comparably lit-
tle (between 2−6) between product classes (Cars, Food, Medicine, Soaps...)
and, perhaps surprisingly, seems not to hinge on the size of the grand set of
alternatives. While consideration set sizes appear to be stable even across
product categories, the content of the consideration sets are not, and de-
pend critically on situational or marketing factors that increase the visibil-
ity or salience of the products (Fader and McAlister (1990), Mitra (1995),
Allenby and Ginter (1995)). This closely matches the tenets from psychol-
ogy on the pertinence of stimulus-driven attention, and also highlightswhy
such findings are important to economics.
Internet research Search engines data provides considerable evidence in-
dicating that information concentrated in certain salient regions receives
critically more attention. For example, it is a well-documented fact that
the on-screen placement of a link on an online search page is a central de-
terminant of the number of clicks that a site receives. Using a dataset of
a price listing service Baye et al. (2009) find that “a firm receives about
17% fewer clicks for every competitor listed above it on the screen", and
the relationship between clicks and screen location is far from linear.10 In
e-commerce, Drèze and Zufryden (2004) show, using data on the web traf-
fic of Amazon and Ebay, that a site can increase its visibility to potential
consumers most by increasing its linkage in the web, thereby improving its
indexing by search engines. In case of computer memory modules Ellison
and Ellison (2009) report that on a price search engine “moving from first
to seventh on the list reduces a website’s sales ... by 83%". Similar find-
ings are documented in case of sponsored search advertising (Ghose and
Yang (2009)). These authors additionally document a non-monotonic rela-
tionship between rank and profitability, which they explain by the fact that
both costs and clicks decrease with a worse rank (a lower on-screen posi-
tion), with clicks decreasing slower than costs. A related finding has been
documented in case of the online book market: Being on the first page of
an online search is vital to receiving a high number of clicks, and in such
perhapsmore important than being the first in the list (Smith and Brynjolfs-
son (2001)). First-page dominance is also found by Jansen et al. (2000). Such
evidence is consistent with attention working as a spotlight: What matters
is to be within the cone of light of attention and less the precise location
within the cone.
Finally, Pan et al. (2007) show in an eyeball-tracking experiment that the
first entries on a Google search page get by far most viewing-time, but
10 The first three positions get about 75% out of all clicks of the first ten on-screen positions,
while positions with rank larger than three do not differ substantially from each other.
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there is no statistical difference between the first and the second item on the
list. In their online experiment these authors find that people frequently
select among the top items of a list in a quality based search experiment
even if these upper items systematically are of inferior quality. Hence this
finding suggests that a salient position of a decision alternative is perhaps
even more important for explaining choice than the actual quality of the
item, and it is an important vindication of the idea that perception precedes
(re)cognition.
In sum, Internet data is broadly consistent with the notion of attention-
constrained users, and the evidence suggests as a stylized observation that
“flashy" orwell-positioned links attract attention (clicks). This finding seems
to coincide with the earlier mentioned literature on visual attention, which
argues that the relative salience of an array of objects determines the speed
or chance of their detection (Nothdurft (2000)).
Stylized findings We have summarized evidence from different fields a-
bout limited attention and its allocationmechanism. Particularly, the above
evidence suggests that
• People have limited attention: They consider only a subset of all in-
formation, if exposed to a lot of information.
• The relative salience of an item (e.g. position, lumination, color) is an
important determinant of its chance of perception (pop-up effect), and
in this respect may outweigh the relevance of the item to a decision-
maker
Moreover, it may be of less importance to be the first on some abstract list of
alternatives, but what matters is to be among the first few entries (the spot-
light effect). In the next sections wewill describe how the various economic
models have incorporated some of these features.
3 The economics of scarce attention: Causes
As Simon put it: Poverty of attention requires an abundance of informa-
tion. Thus besides the existence of constraints on how much information
can be handled, an economy must produce such an amount of information
that these constraints become binding. This can be complicated by the fact
that these constraints themselves may be endogenous, e.g. an outcome of
some decision process depending e.g. on the presumed quality of the in-
formation available.
In this section we review several models that treat the abundance of infor-
mation, and scarcity of attention, as an endogenous outcome. While limited
attention is introduced differently in these models, the underlying causes
of information overload are similar, and roughly summarized by the fol-
lowing. Attention is more likely to become a scarce resource if the measure
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of active senders (firms) increases, or consumers reduce their willingness
to pay attention. The former occurs if market prospects increase, e.g. be-
cause consumerwealth, willingness to pay or economicmarket power from
attracting attention increases or information transmission costs decrease.
The latter may happen, for example, if the size of the attention set is a part
of the (consumer) decision process and attention costs increase or attention
revenues to consumers decrease (e.g. because of lower expected product
quality).
The main logical reason for why the different models have a very simi-
lar prediction of what causes scarce attention is that they all are set up as
regime switch models, which essentially reflects the incorporation of lim-
ited attention as a capacity constraint. As long as attention is not scarce the
main equilibrium information variables (the measure of active senders or
transmitted information volume) essentially follow standard theory. Only
if overall information exceeds some threshold value the attention economy
becomes important. It is beyond this point where the various models begin
to differ with respect to their predictions.
Capacity constraints A meaningful notion of scarce attention or, equiv-
alently, of superabundant information, requires a quantification of infor-
mation items by some measure-theoretic concept. As soon as the infor-
mation load is quantifiable, limited attention can be introduced formally
as a restriction or a threshold on the amount of information that is pro-
cessed. Regarding capacity measures, the literature can be divided into
item-based and volume-based capacity constraints, and we consider both
in turn. In sloppy terms the main difference between the two is that in
the volume-based approach to limited attention it is less the numbers of
market-shouters but rather their aggregate shouting volume that depletes
a consumer’s mental resources.
3.1 Volume-based capacity constraints
Falkinger (2008) introduces limited attention as a capacity constraint on
the perceivable information volume by consumers into a model of non-
strategic, symmetric monopolistic competition.11
The model Regarding information technology, a firm j is described by
the size of its potential audience, i.e. by how many consumers a firm can
reach (the firm range), and by their signal strength σj . While firm range is
an exogenous characteristic, firms must choose their signal strength such
to make their messages salient in their attempt to survive the competition
for attention. All firms have the same attention technology. The exogeneity
of the firm range means that a consumer’s information set Xi cannot be
11 The paper considers the case of multi-product firms, but the essential results can be
demonstrated already with single-product firms.
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influenced by firm activities other than by their decisions to enter or exit the
market. Each Xi consists of the same measure of firms (i.e. differentiated
products).12
Limited attention is introduced as an exogenous threshold level τ0 on the
aggregate volume τ =
∫
j∈Xi σj of all messages received by a consumer. If
j ∈ Xi, then j is perceived if and only if j’s messages are sufficiently loud,
i.e. if and only if σj ≥ σmin ≥ 1. Expressed in terms of attention profiles
(P(Xi), P ) the allocation function P can be written as
P (A) =
{
1 ifA =
⋃ {j ∈ Xi : σj ≥ σmin}
0 else (1)
which implies for firm j’s chances of perception
Pi(j ∈ Ai) =
{
1 σj ≥ σmin
0 else , j ∈ Xi
Hence if all firms in Xi broadcast sufficiently loudly (with strength σmin),
then P (Xi) = 1, and P (A) = 0 for any A ( Xi. This is a difference to
models with item-based capacity constraints, where perception naturally is
of a stochastic nature. To close the model, the following gating mechanism
is specified:
σmin =
{
1 τ ≤ τ0
τ
τ0
τ > τ0
(2)
If aggregate volume τ is below the threshold value τ0, sending at the min-
imal signal strength 1 asserts perception, whereas signal strength must ex-
ceed 1 if aggregate volume exceeds τ0. Intuitively, this means that louder
shouting is required to be heard as aggregate noise increases. Producing a
signal of strength σ costs the firm an amount of C(σ). Hence in this model
attention costs technically work as an endogenous fixed cost: The height of
these costs depends on the current noise level τ , and any firm that can af-
ford these costs will be heard by all consumers in its range. With a measure
of T firms, a consumer receives a measure of M = φT messages, where
φ ∈ (0, 1] denotes firm range. As all active firms send at strength σmin,
consumer exposure to information is τ = φTσmin.
Regarding the productmarket, the paper adopts the symmetric, non-atomistic
monopolistic competition model with exogenous consumer wealth y > 0
and elasticity parameter ε. Equilibrium profits are given by Π = φ∆yMε −
C(σmin).
Causes of an attention economy An economy is information-poor if signal
exposure satisfies τ ≤ τ0, otherwise the economy is information-rich. The
zero-profit condition together with the gating mechanism (2) imply that
12 As utility is symmetric with respect to all products in X , and competition is symmetric
and non-strategic it does not matter which products exactly populate the information sets.
Œconomia – History | Methodology | Philosophy, 5(1): 37-76
50 Andreas Hefti and Steve Heinke |
an information-rich economy emerges if and only if φ∆yC(1)ε ≥ τ0. This in-
equality reveals that the economy is more likely to be information-rich if i)
information technology improves (larger potential market φ∆ or lower in-
formation (fix)costs C(1)) or ii) product market prospects increase (higher
per-consumer wealth y or lower demand elasticity ε).
3.2 Item-based limited capacity constraints
In this section we review some contributions, where limited attention is
quantified over the measure of information items rather than signal vol-
ume. Besides the conceptual difference in the way information (and at-
tention) is measured, the zero-mass assumption in Falkinger (2008) is not
completely innocent in a setting with limited attention. In the model of the
last section the zero-mass assumption of senders means that important in-
teractions of limited attentionwith the ability of a firm to strategically set its
price, signal strength or other relevant economic attributes, such as quality,
are excluded. While zero-mass firms are perhaps reasonable in a macroe-
conomic world without any explicit attention concerns, this seems more
problematic especially by themainmessage of limited attention, namely that
perception windows are potentially very small compared to the overall size
of alternatives.13 But this means that perceived firms are not small on a re-
ceiver’s mind, which makes firm interaction in the perceived market essen-
tially strategic. In fact, there is strong evidence that firms try to exploit con-
sumer browsing behavior. For example, it is known that firms sometimes
increase online prices if a particular consumer returns to their website, to
give him the impression of economic scarcity. Such behavior can be un-
derstood as part of firm obfuscation tactics (see section 5.2), and generally
suggests that firms try to price to the “subjective" market as represented in
the consumers’ heads, and less to the “objective" market. Such arguments
emphasize the need to analyze the consequences of limited attention in an
oligopolistic (game-theoretic) setting.
The model The following exposition builds on Hefti (2012). For simplic-
ity we set Xi = X throughout this section. A simple way of quantifying
the “weight" of a collection of information items, e.g. in terms of mental
resources required to recognize (“decode”) these items, is to define a mea-
sure ri : P(X)→ [0,∞]. For j ∈ Xi, ri(j) > 0 is item j’s informationweight
to receiver i. Limited attention means the existence of an upper bound
1 ≤ Ri < ∞ on the quantity of perceivable information. For simplicity
we set ri = |·| (the count measure), and capture heterogeneity in attention
capacities by the distribution of Ri ∈ N over the population. Note that the
threshold levelRi can be introduced as an exogenous constraint (Van Zandt
(2004), Anderson and De Palma (2012)) or as part of the consumer decision
process (Anderson and De Palma (2009), Hefti (2012)). GivenRi we can de-
13 This is a central emphasis of marketing studies such as Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990).
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fine the psychologically feasible set as the collection of all possible attention
sets that i can perceive, i.e. Ai ≡ {A ⊂ X : |A| = Ri} ⊂ P(X). We call the
pair (Ai, Pi) an attention profile, where Pi is a (possibly degenerate) proba-
bility distribution over the attention sets in Ai. Note that if |X| ≤ Ri then
Ai = X , and the only possible probability function Pi assigns the value
1 to X . This depicts the case where the attention constraint is not strictly
binding, and there is no attention allocation problem.14
For a given attention profile, chances of perceiving item j are given by
P (j) =
∑
A∈Bij Pi(A), where Bij = {A ∈ Ai : j ∈ A}. Together with the
demand function di, consumer behavior is described by (Ai, Pi, di).15 Turn-
ing to firms we assume that attracting i’s attention (joint with |A| − 1 com-
petitors) generates a surplus of V ji (A). Given the attention profiles (Ai, Pi)
and the value function V ji (·) we obtain the following simple structure of
firm j’s expected earnings:
pij =
∑
A∈Bij
Pi(A)V
j
i (A) (3)
In case of spare attention capacities (|X| < Ri), expression (3) reduces to
pij = V ji (X).
Anderson and De Palma (2009) and Hefti (2012) consider firm-consumer
models, where Ri is endogenously determined by consumers anticipating
the expected value of the incoming messages.16 In these models it depends
on the fundamentals underlying the choice process whether or not scarce
attention results in equilibrium. Anderson and De Palma (2009) consider
the case of exogenously ranked firms (in terms of their profitability) with
fixed and equal perception chances, whereas in Hefti (2012) firms must
compete in prices on the product market as well as for consumer atten-
tion. Regarding the questions, if and when attention constraints are bind-
ing, both models broadly offer the same insights, and we concentrate here
on Anderson and De Palma (2009) because of its relative simplicity.
Let the measure of firms and consumers be normalized to unity. Firms are
distributed over [0, 1], where firm j ∈ [0, 1] receives an exogenous value
V (j) if its products are consumed. The value function V (j) is strictly de-
creasing in firm type j, which reflects exogenous differences in firm prof-
itability. As this model features no product market competition the trans-
action value V (j) simply measures the value of attention to that firm. Each
14 Note that standard economic models can be placed in this framework by settingRi =∞.
15 From (Ai, Pi, di) all objects of interest can be deduced. For example, i’s expected demand
isDi = E[di(A) : A ∈ Ai] =
∑
A∈Ai di(A)Pi(A), and i
′s demand for j ∈ X corresponds to
the j-th projection ofDi.
16 A related spirit is present e.g. in Reis (2006), where the attention decision amounts to
choosing the points of time, where a consumer learns the instantaneous state of the economy
by paying attention at that time, and thereafter adjust his consumption- or savings plan. As
receiving such an update (i.e. being attentive) is costly, a consumer cannot be attentive all
the time, but tends to be attentive more frequently if either the explicit cost of receiving an
update or the implicit cost of not being attentive (e.g. failing to adjust the consumption plan
in a volatile economy) increase.
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consumer randomly and independently samples R firms, and acquires a
product of each firm in his sample.
In terms of (3), this model satisfies V j(A) = V j ≡ V (j) for all A ∈ Bj
(no product market competition), and P (j) = min{Rn , 1} for active senders
(P (j) = 0 otherwise), where n is the measure of active senders17, and R ∈
[0, 1] is each consumer’s attention span. Hence P (j) simply corresponds to
the fraction of (randomly) examined items.
Sending amessage costs γ, andprofits of active senders areΠj = P (j)V (j)−
γ. Every firm decides whether or not to send a message (e.g. to advertise),
and sendingmore than onemessage is assumed to be non-profitable.18 The
measure of active senders n(R) is determined by the zero-profit condition
P (n)V (n) = γ. Depending on whether or not attention constraints are
binding, n either satisfies n = nmax = V −1(γ) (if R ≥ nmax) or n solves
RV (n)
n = γ.
Consumers rationally choose their attention spanR by weighting marginal
benefits against an exogenous, increasing and strictly convex attention cost
C(R). Let s(j) quantify the benefits of item j to a consumer. Then S(n) =
1
n
∫ n
0
s(j)dj is the average benefit, given that n firms are active. Assuming
independent draws with uniform sampling probabilities gives the net ex-
pected benefit of samplingR firms as EU(R) = RS(n)−C(R). For given n
the consumers choose to be fully attentive if and only if S(n) − C ′(n) ≥ 0,
in which case they set R(n) = n. If S(n) − C ′(n) < 0, then they rationally
ignore some available information. Overall, the optimal attention span is
determined by R(n) = min{n,C ′−1(S(n))}.
Causes of an attention economy Whether or not there is information con-
gestion (i.e. attention constraints are binding) depends on the firms entry
decision n(R) and consumers’ choice of attention span R(n), and both de-
cisions are interlinked. As a result attention becomes scarce if n ≥ n˜, where
S(n˜) = C ′−1(n˜). Hence congestion is more likely to occur, the higher the
measure of active senders n, and n is higher if either information costs de-
cline or the revenue distribution V (j) shifts up. On the consumer side we
see that higher sampling costs or lower average consumer surplus increases
chances of information congestion, because consumers reduce their atten-
tion spans.
4 The economics of scarce attention:
Consequences
In this section, we track down some of the essential findings regarding
the consequences of limited attention for economics. We begin by con-
17 At the same time n is the marginal active type in this model.
18 This is a fundamental difference to Hefti (2012), where firms send multiple messages be-
cause they must compete for attention.
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trasting results from theories of scarce information, particularly informa-
tive advertising (section 4.1), but unbounded attention capacities, to those
obtained from models with scarce attention. This comparison exemplifies
that the two types of scarcities may have fundamentally different implica-
tions on howamarket or an economyworks, which justifies an independent
and self-contained theory of attention in economic research. For example,
whereas increasing product diversity or cheaper information technology
are associated with pro-competitive effects, and improve consumer welfare
in case of informative advertising, such conclusionsmay be exactly reversed
if attention becomes the scarce resource (section 4.2). Further, the channel
of decreasing cultural distinction in an increasingly globalized world de-
pends on the prevailing type of scarcity in an economy (section 4.3). If
attention is a scarce resource that has to be shared among several sectors
in an economy, then the sector size distribution depends on how attentive
consumers are (section 4.5). We also present a model addressing howmar-
ket inefficiencies caused by attention externalities could be corrected, and
how such correctives might be implemented (section 4.4).
4.1 Scarce information: The case of informative advertising
In models of informative advertising, such as Butters (1977), Shapiro (1980)
or Grossman and Shapiro (1984), consumers (information receivers) are ex-
ante unaware of the products, and can only learn about a product by receiv-
ing ads. Advertising is informative19 in the sense that it truthfully conveys
price and product information, but does not otherwise affect a consumer’s
evaluation of the products. It is an (implicit) assumption in these models
that Ai = Xi, attention sets and information sets always coincide or, equiv-
alently, that attention capacities are unbounded (Ri =∞).
If ads are randomly sent to consumers, as is the case in the aforementioned
papers, information sets are stochastic and thus usually different among
different consumers. In terms of our primitives, this means that while Pi
just is the unit function, the information sets Xi are random20 but depend
on the firms’ choices of how strong to advertise. Moreover, Xi ( X can
occur if firms do no fully exhaust their advertising capacities, e.g. because
of strategic considerations (Grossman and Shapiro (1984)), or due to tech-
nological limitations. Hence perception is stochastic in such models, and
depends on the information efforts of the competing firms - so is this set-
ting not just a further variant of a stimulus-driven attention model? This
clearly is a question of fundamental importance, as it asks if the cause of
limited consumer consideration—because there is too little or too much
information—matters.
With informative advertising firms have an incentive to increase their infor-
19 If advertising is of a persuasive nature, then a consumer’s choice function di depends di-
rectly on actions taken by the firm (e.g. advertising-dependent preferences). See Bagwell
(2007) for a comprehensive survey on the different forms of advertising.
20 More formally, informative advertising works through the Φi-function from section 1.1.
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mation efforts, because they then possibly reach previously bad or even un-
informed consumers, from which high information rents can be extracted.
In the modern, digitized society consumers are far less likely to have too
little information,21 but limited attention capacities imply that they fail to
consider all received messages. Hence firms have a clear incentive to in-
crease their information efforts, not to reach new, unaware consumers, but
rather to capture the attention of an overloaded consumer, and thereby pos-
sibly inhibit perception by other competitors.
Looking at the main insights from models of informative advertising, a
standard comparative-static conclusion is, that cheaper setup or informa-
tion costs, or larger potential markets, e.g. due to increased information
accessibility by consumers, work in a pro-competitive way, and have pos-
itive consumer welfare effects by putting downward pressure on prices or
increasing equilibrium product diversity.22 Wewill see in the next sections
that such a conclusion is greatly challenged if attention is the scarce re-
source. Moreover, if information costs approach zero, the equilibrium ap-
proaches the standard case of perfect information. This explains whymany
have celebrated the introduction and expansion of the Internet as the new
supermedium, leading to frictionless commerce. Yet, roughly ten years af-
ter the Internet revolution began, many researchers were surprised about
the results it produced, as evidence indicated far more price dispersion
for apparently homogeneous goods, higher profit margins and generally
pricing patterns that seem inconsistent with standard models (see Ellison
and Ellison (2005) for a good overview). Intuitively, limited attention and
related phenomena such as obfuscation, are important candidates for ex-
plaining what seem to be anomalies from the perspective of standard the-
ory. To gauge the potential of an attention theory for filling this gap, it is
vital to have a clear understanding of how the patterns of an economywith
scarce attention differ from those produced by an economy with scarce in-
formation, which is the central topic of the next section.
4.2 Limited attention and oligopolistic competition
Hefti (2012) analyzes the case, where firms strategically compete for atten-
tion and prices both assuming an abstract model of horizontal product dif-
ferentiation as well as particular examples, such as the CES or the Ideal-
Variety model. Competition for attention is modeled as a contest, where
the allocation rule Pi is determined by the efforts to attract attention in a
relative way, and attention revenues (i.e. conditional demand) depends on
the pricing strategies.
With identical consumers and symmetrically behaving opponents, a firms
problem is to choose its prices and attention efforts (p, f) in order to maxi-
21 In fact the case of a completely interlinked digital information society would suggest to
setXi = X , as physical locations are of no importance.
22 A similar conclusion holds for conventional consumer search models if search costs de-
cline, see section 5.2.
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mize
Π = pi
(
f, f¯ , n,R
)
V j(p, p¯, z)− C(f)− F z = min {R,n} (4)
where, (p¯, f¯) is an opponent’s strategy, C(·) are attention costs, F > 0 is
an exogenous setup cost and n is the number of active senders. Finally,
pi ∈ [0, 1] is the firm’s chance of perception, where pi = 1 if R ≥ n (uncon-
strained attention), and pi is zero-homogeneous in (f, f¯) (relative salience)
if n > R. Expression (4) summarizes the interdependence of competition
for attention with economic competition. Firms choose their attention ef-
forts, i.e. their perception probabilities in dependence of their economic
prospects. These depend on (strategic) pricing, which in turn depends, in-
ter alia, on consumer attentivenessR. As a change in attentivenessR affects
both perception chances and pricing if attention is constrained (R < n),
the relationship between attention-seeking, pricing and consumer atten-
tiveness clearly is non-trivial, thereby highlighting a central difference to
the zero-mass setting of Falkinger (2008). Moreover, representing the strug-
gle for attention with a multi-prize contest, where prizes reflect the value
of attention, nicely matches the spotlight-feature of attention from section
2, according to which being detected among the first items matters for cog-
nition, but not so much being the first among the detected items.
An important insight of the paper is that if attention rather than informa-
tion is the scarce resource, the resulting positive and normative equilibrium
patterns of the economy can be fundamentally different. In other words
the cause of why consumers have limited information has first-order conse-
quences for economic outcome.
In a symmetric equilibrium with free entry and endogenous limited atten-
tion (i.e. n > R) firms choose prices p and attention efforts f such that (4)
is maximized. The equilibrium vector (p, f, n) is determined by
V1(p, p,R) = 0
pi1(f, f, n,R)V (p, p,R) = C
′(f)
R
n V (p, p,R) = F + C(f)
(5)
In this setting, attention has two important dimensions: attentiveness (R)
and responsiveness. Attentiveness, i.e. the threshold level R, affects i) the
(marginal) chance of perception and ii) the conditional rents of (in)attention.
Responsiveness pertains to how costly it is for firms to shift attention in
their favor. An appealing property of the contest-formulation (4) is that
the elasticity of the cost function C(f) captures the responsiveness effect.
If e.g. C(f) = θfη , η > 1, then a larger value of η means that consumers
are more resilient against marketing methods. Whether or not inattention
rents are competed away by equilibrium forces (whether or not n′(R) < 0
or n′(R) > 0) depends crucially on attentiveness and responsiveness.23 The
paper shows that inattention rents rather prevail (i.e. n′(R) < 0) i) themore
23 This is a major difference to Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a,b), where competition engulfs all
attention rents.
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competitive amarket is (i.e. themore products are perceived as substitutes)
or ii) the more consumers are resilient against marketing methods (lower
responsiveness).
Limited attention and ideal varieties Important insights on consumer
welfare can be obtained by applying the above setting to the well-known
circular model of ideal variety. In this model, consumers and firms are uni-
formly distributed over the unit circle, where a consumer’s location can be
interpreted as his ideal variety. Consuming at a different location is associ-
ated with some inconvenience. Consumer i’s utility from consuming j-th
product is Ui = V − pj − twij , where wj is the smallest arc distance be-
tween i’s and j’s location, and t > 0 quantifies unit transportation costs.
Consumer i purchases one unit at the best perceived location. The central
measure of consumer welfare in this model are average consumer trans-
portation costs T (R,n). The paper shows that equilibrium transportation
costs are
T (R,n) = tw¯ = t ·
{ n+1
2n(R+1) − 14n R < n
1
4n R ≥ n
(6)
Hence forR ≥ nmore aggregate diversity always reduces the average expe-
rienced mismatch, because i) perceived and effective markets coincide and
ii) firms are located closer together. Grossman and Shapiro (1984) show
that this result extends to the case of scarce information (but unbounded
attention capacities). In contrast, (6) shows that if and only if attention is
scarce (n > R) aggregate transportation costs increase in the number of ac-
tive senders n.
The fundamental difference between scarce information and scarce atten-
tion, responsible for the above result, is that perceiving some alternatives
under capacity limitations necessarily reduces the spare mental capacities
for other alternatives. This in turn gives an additional welfare effect, the
inferiority effect, which says that if diversity increases, then consumers, on
average, pick a worse item compared to their prior choice as long as all
items have the same perception chance (which is the case in the symmetric
equilibrium). The paper shows that in the ideal variety model this inferi-
ority effect dominates the matching effect, capturing that with increased
diversity better products were, in principal, available.24 In sum, this model
shows that a central conclusion of a model with scarce information is ex-
actly reversed with scarce attention.
4.3 Limited attention and the channel of cultural distinc-
tion
We now return to the monopolistic competition model by Falkinger (2008),
introduced in section 3.1, and present some central consequences of limited
24 Moreover, the paper argues that this negative welfare effect of increased diversity is also
present, and potentially even reinforced, if attentiveness Ri is also a part of the consumer’s
choice problem.
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attention in that setting. In this model aggregate diversity of products in
the economy is given by the number of active senders, which corresponds
to nIP = ∆yεC(1) in an information-poor (IP) economy, and to n
IR = 1φτ0 in
an information-rich (IR) economy. The parameters are income y, demand
elasticity ε, firm range φ and volume threshold τ0. Hence while traditional
fundamentals such as money in the market relative to fixcosts ( ∆yC(1) ), or
profitability of transactions to firms (quantified by demand elasticity ε) de-
termine equilibrium profits and thus diversity in an IP economy, they mat-
ter for the IR case only insofar they are decisive for whether or not an IR
economy emerges. Aggregate diversity in an IR economy depends only on
(exogenous) information technology (φ) and attention threshold τ0. Look-
ingmore at the details of the model shows that this result originates from i)
the proportionality of the gating mechanism (2) and, more importantly, ii)
the absence of the competitive aspects of limited attention e.g. for pricing
decisions, which is a consequence of the zero-mass setting.25
One consequence of limited attention, emphasized by the paper, is a change
in the channel of cultural distinction as an economy moves from IP to IR.
In case of single-product firms cultural distinction is measured by the ratio
between the measure of active senders (aggregate diversity) and the mea-
sure of individual attention sets. Hence this ratio is ≥ 1, where equal-
ity means that every consumer perceives exactly the same set of items,
and there is no cultural distinction. In equilibrium, it turns out that in
both regimes cultural distinction is given by 1φ , i.e. cultural distinction de-
pends only on the information transmission technology, and decreases if
firm range φ ∈ (0, 1] increases. Yet there is a difference between IP and IR
inwhat causes this comparative-static result. In an IP economy cultural dis-
tinction decreases in firm range because perceiveddiversity increases (more
consumers hear about the firm) but aggregate diversity remains fixed in
equilibrium.26 In an IR economy cultural distinction decreases in φ because
aggregate diversity declines but, by limited attention, perceived diversity is
constant. The reason why aggregate diversity declines is that an increased
firm range implies higher consumer signal exposure and thus declining at-
tention. Therefore firms must spend more resources on maintaining their
salience levels27, which means that fewer firms survive the competition for
attention.
4.4 Information congestion: Correctives
One commonality of all attention models discussed so far is that the defin-
ing property of a modern (information-rich) economy is information over-
flow, or information congestion. In their paper Anderson and De Palma
(2009) (see section 3.2) compare the market outcome (i.e. the number of
25 For example, in the oligopolistic setting of Hefti (2012) variables such as income or de-
mand elasticity also matter for equilibrium diversity if attention is scarce.
26 This occurs because competition is independent of the measure of received messages.
27 The result is a direct consequence of (2).
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active firms) with endogenous information congestion to the optimal plan-
ner solution.28 Information congestion (i.e. endogenous limited attention)
obviously never is a socially optimal outcome. If the equilibrium is un-
congested, then information is underprovided (i.e. n is too low), simply
because senders do not internalize receiver benefits. Hence a subsidy on
senders solves the problem.29 What is different if attention is a scarce re-
source? If information is congested (i.e. R < n) especially because send-
ing information is cheap (low γ), then the social optimum involves reduc-
ing the measure of active senders (by a sender tax) and increasing individ-
ual attention spans by a receiver subsidy. Intuitively, this occurs because i)
the receivers do not internalize the senders’ benefits of being heard (hence
they are too inattentive), and ii) there are too many senders in the market
because individual senders do not take into account their marginal social
value. However, the authors note that, with congested equilibria, correc-
tive taxes could also involve receiving and sending more (especially if γ is
high). Noting that receiver subsidies might be problematic to implement
as receivers might falsely claim to have examined messages, the authors
investigate the welfare consequences of personal contact prices (want to
call me - pay me) and a monopoly access platform. In both cases there
is a nuisance cost ω > 0 for any message arriving at the receiver’s home
(e.g. the ringing of the phone) that is borne by the consumer independent
of whether or not he considers the message content. While the monopoly
platform ignores ω, both the platform and personal pricing will price out
congestion. To see why, note that deciding about a (personal) price means
selecting the marginal firm. Suppose that for given R we have n > R. In
the platform case the platform bears the per-message cost γ and sets a (non-
discriminatory) access price equal to p(n) = Rn V (n), i.e. all firmswith n˜ < n
have positive expected profits and acquire access to the platform. Hence
the platform earns (p(n)− γ)n = RV (n)− γn, and setting n = R leaves the
platform with higher profits because of a higher price (pi(R) > pi(n)) and
lower transmission costs. The same reasoning applies to personal prices.
While under both mechanisms congestion is priced out, it depends on the
parameters, especially γ and nuisance ω, whether or not the platform so-
cially outperforms personal pricing. As is intuitive personal pricing tends
to work better than a platform if nuisance costs ω are small, as the platform
does not take into account consumer surplus from messages.
4.5 Attentional spillovers between sectors
Anderson and De Palma (2012) consider the case, where several firms from
several sectors compete for limited consumer attention. In a nutshell the
authors show that attentiveness (R) and the size distribution of the differ-
ent sectors are correlated, in the direction that less attentiveness tends to-
28 Remember that in their model there is no actual competition for attention as firms cannot
influence their chance of perception.
29 Their model by construction excludes a business-stealing effect.
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wards magnifying pre-existing differences in sector market-shares. More-
over, limited attention may imply spillover-effects between sectors, as e.g.
single-sector profitability shocks affect equilibrium prices in other sectors
only by a shift in the attention probabilities.
There is a number Θˆ > 1 of active sectors, each accommodating a measure
nθ > 0 of firms. Within each sector, all active firms produce a homoge-
neous good at constant unit costs cθ and, as in Anderson and De Palma
(2009) can send a (untargeted) message to a consumer at cost γθ > 0. Con-
sumers in turn are identical, and have an exogenously fixed attention span
R > 1, measuring the number of messages examined. The important atten-
tional assumptions of themodel are i) firms cannot influence their chance of
perception beyond sending a single message (e.g. no salience competition),
and ii) each singlemessage has the same chance of perception, independent
of which firm or sector it is sent from. As a consequence the number of ac-
tive firms in a sector nθ and the number ofmessages from that sector always
coincide, andmessage costs can be thought of as entry (fixed) costs in a con-
ventional way. In particular, these entry costs do not vary with themeasure
of messages sent (other than Falkinger (2008)). Moreover, the market share
and the information share of a sector nθN , whereN =
∑Θˆ
θ=1 nθ, are identical.
Concerning economic competition, the central assumptions are that there
are no competitive spillovers between sectors (products are independent),
and consumers acquire qθ units of the cheapest perceived product in each
sector, provided that the sector price does not exceed the exogenously fixed
reservation price bθ > cθ, where cθ are the constant sector-specific unit pro-
duction costs. In a sector, firms decide whether or not to enter (i.e. to send
a message), and set a product price (drawn from a sector-specific common
price distribution). In terms of our primitives, we haveXi = X =
⋃Θˆ
θ=1 Jθ,
where Jθ = [0, nθ] is the set of all active firms in sector θ and for R < N a
consumer’s attention set A ⊂ X satisfies |A| = R. Firm jθ of sector θ sells
qθ units of his product to a consumer, if i) it is perceived and ii) it has the
lowest price among perceived within-sector competitors. Formally:
P (jθ sells) = P
(
jθ ∈ A, pjθ = min{pjiθ : pjiθ ∈ A}
)
= P (jθ ∈ A) · P
(
pjθ = min{pjiθ : pjiθ ∈ A}
)
= RN · P
(
pjθ = min{pjiθ : pjiθ ∈ A}
)
where the second equality holds because attracting attention andprice com-
petition are independent, and the last equality follows as all items have
the same chance of perception. The remaining probability depends on the
sector-specific equilibrium price distribution, which is endogenously de-
termined (by sector-wise zero-profit conditions) and depends on attention
probabilities (i.e. relative sector size) as well as on exogenous parameters
(bθ, cθ, γθ, qθ) (sector profitability). To determine the equilibrium sector-
specific measure of active firms nθ in this model, it suffices by the logic
of the (sector-wise) mixed-strategy price equilibrium to require the zero-
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profit condition to hold for the highest possible price pjθ = bθ, as then,
given the equilibrium price distribution, no further firm has an incentive to
enter the sector. With pjθ = bθ it is only possible to make a sale if jθ is the
only perceived firm from sector θ, which occurs with probability
P (jθ ∈ A, gθ /∈ A ∀ gθ 6= jθ) = P (jθ ∈ A) · (1− P (jθ ∈ A))R−1
∼= RN
(
1− nθN
)R−1
where the first equality holds because attention allocation is independent
within sectors. To understand the final expression on the right, note that
nθ
N is the probability of sampling a firm of sector θ in one of the other R− 1
draws. The final expression underestimates the true probability of being
a perceived sector monopolist, because the formula is obtained under the
assumption of drawswith replacement, but ignores the possibility, that firm
jθ then could be drawn several times. Plugging this probability into the
zero-profit condition yields
R
N
(
1− nθ
N
)R−1
=
γθ
(bθ − cθ)qθ ≡
1
piθ
(7)
wherepiθ can be thought of as ameasure of sector profitability. In thismodel
the exogenous sector profitability ties down relative sector sizes for given
N , where, ceteris paribus, more profitable sectors have a largermarket (and
attention) share. Assuming pi1 ≥ pi2 ≥ ... expression (7) can be used to
find how market shares depend on attentiveness R. First, sector profitabil-
ity and advertising share are positively correlated, because higher sector
profitability increases relative sector size. On the one hand if R increases,
then the (ad) market share of the most profitable sector (θ = 1) decreases,
whereas the share of the weakest sector increases. Hence more consumer
attention tends to equate shares. Intuitively, this occurs because more at-
tentiveness reduces the (conditional) chances of being the only perceived
firm of a sector most for the most profitable sector, rendering that sector
less attractive. On the other hand if R → 1, then the most profitable sec-
tor harnesses almost the entiremarket. A further particular property of this
model is that if information costs are halved, thenmessage volume doubles,
leaving both price distributions and the number of active sectors constant.
This is driven by the fact that message volume and the measure of senders
are equal.30 If however message costs (profitability) only change for some
sectors, the equilibrium price distribution of each sector is affected. Specifi-
cally, an increase of profitability in one sector decreases prices in that sector
and increases prices in the other sectors, in the sense of first-order stochas-
tic dominance. The reason is that attention is a fixed resource commonly
utilized by all sectors, meaning that if one sector absorbs more attention
30 If the probability of receiving attention can be smoothly influenced as in Hefti (2012), then
a symmetric reduction in attention costs can increase bothmessages sent at the individual and
the aggregate level without affecting the equilibrium measure of senders.
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(i.e. sends more messages), less resources are available for the other sec-
tors. But the sector sending more messages necessarily experiences more
competition, as chances of being the only perceived firm from that sector
decrease, which puts downwards pressure on prices.31 The same argument
says that prices tend to increase in the other sectors, because messages of
these sectors are crowded out in relative terms by the more active sector.
In this model such spillovers occur only because attention is scarce, as sec-
tors otherwise are independent. We will see in section 5.1 that a somewhat
related crowding-out logic can be utilized by strategically behaving firms
when designing their product lines in order to grab attention and reduce
comparison to other brands.
5 Market phenomena related to limited attention
In this section we focus on recent contributions related to attention, where
limited attention matters less as a bound on perception in the context of
abundant information, but rather plays a role for the possibilities of firms
to extract (in)attention rents from boundedly rational consumers.
5.1 Competitive marketing with sticky consideration
Eliaz and Spiegler (2011a) study a model, where each consumer is ex ante
allocated to one of two firms (his status quo), but marketing devices can
be used to persuade a consumer into considering the alternative product.
An important conceptual difference to previously discussed articles, par-
ticularly to Falkinger (2008) and Hefti (2012), is that consumer attention ca-
pacity is not limited in the sense that consumers never “forget" their status
quo product: They either consider only their status quo, or both products.
Firms can use marketing devices to make non status quo consumers aware
of their product. If a firm succeeds in its attempt, the corresponding con-
sumer has a complete consideration set, i.e. she considers both alternatives
whenmaking her choice. Whatmakes themodel interesting is that product
attributes, e.g. quality, and “pure” marketing features (such as packaging
or advertising) can influence a consumer’s consideration process.
The model In their model Xi = X is a finite set of a vertically differ-
entiated product. The elements of X can be thought of as different vari-
eties, which are quality-ordered, i.e. (X,) is a linearly ordered set with
-maximal and -minimal elements x∗, x∗. Consumers are identical up to
the fact that one half of the unit population has firm j as their status quo
product assignment, and the other half initially considers only the product
of firm g. Hence Ai(j) = {{j}, {j, g}} is the set of all possible attention sets
of a consumer i with status quo j. Both firms simultaneously choose their
strategies, where a strategy is a pair (x,m) (called the extended product)
31 Roughly, this is the same rationale for why p′(R) < 0 in Hefti (2012).
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with x ∈ X and m ∈ M , where M is a finite set of marketing activities.
>From the perspective of a consumer (xs,ms) denotes his default extended
product, and (xn,mn) is the alternative extended product. In their setting,
whether or not a consumer can be persuaded to consider the alternative
product is deterministic, given the default strategy (xs,ms), but the equi-
librium qualities andmarketing activities are stochastic as firms playmixed
strategies. Whether or not a consumer considers the respective alternative
product is captured by a consideration function φ : (X × M)2 → {0, 1},
where φ = 1 indicates that the alternative product xn is considered. With
strategies (xs,ms), (xn,mn) perception chances of a consumer i with de-
fault firm j are
Pi(j)(A) =
{
1 A = {j}, φ(xs,ms, xn,mn) = 0
1 A = {j, g}, φ(xs,ms, xn,mn) = 1 A ∈ Ai(j)
Each consumer selects the -maximal product in his attention set. Prod-
uct quality andmarketing are both associatedwith additive-separable costs
roughly satisfying monotonicity, i.e. higher quality and larger marketing
campaigns (in the sense that they enable consideration for more values of
the default) are more expensive. The model is set up as a competition for
market shares, and the cost function satisfies c(x,m) < 12 . Under the ratio-
nal consumer benchmark, i.e. where all consumers ex-ante have both prod-
ucts as status quo and Pi(j, g)) = 1, the unique equilibrium strategy is to
set (x,m) = (x∗, ∅), becausemarketing cannotmake products disperceived,
and any x 6= x∗ can be profitably overbidden. In the rational consumer case
each firm earns a payoff 12 − c(x∗, ∅).
Offensive marketing The authors discuss essentially two types of mar-
keting activities. The first type takes a consideration function of the form
φ(xs,mn). Hence for given ownqualityxs, marketing activities of the oppo-
nent determinewhether or not the alternative product is considered, mean-
ing that advertising is of a purely offensive nature in this setting. In this case
the symmetric equilibrium necessarily is mixed. The authors show that i)
inferior products are offered with positive probability, ii) firms advertise
with positive probability and iii) firms earn the rational consumer bench-
mark profits. The last observation is in fact a quite robust result under the
main assumptions in this setting.32 Hence market forces compete away any
potential gains from (ex-ante) limited consumer considerations.33
Salience competition The second type of consideration function satisfies
the property that φ(xs,ms, xn,mn) = 1 if and only ifmn ≥ ms. This type of
consideration function reflects the idea that advertisingmay also be used to
32 The authors show that the firms possibly can earn more than the rational benchmark if
e.g. there is a small population of perfectly informed consumers, or the consideration function
violates being “partitional".
33 This is in stark contrast to Hefti (2012), where profitability under limited attention gener-
ically is different from the case of consumers with unbounded attention capacities.
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inhibit consumer consideration of the alternative product, and is closer to
the idea of salience competition. Under this consideration function, firms
still earn the rational consumer profit in the symmetricmixed strategy equi-
librium, but the fact that inferior products are offeredwith positive equilib-
rium probabilities shows that advertising needs not signal higher quality,
contrary to standard results of the advertising literature.34 Intuitively, this
occurs because advertising in this setup jams the opponent’s messages, in
which cases the consideration set just consists of the default product, mean-
ing that the competitive pressure of high quality is absent.
Consumer conversion The authors further show that if advertising has
the above jamming-property, this may affect consumer conversion rates.
Under the purely offensive type of consideration function, consumer con-
version rates are perfect, meaning that whenever a consumer is induced
to consider a new product, he ends up buying it. This extreme result may
break down if advertising is both offensive and defensive. Then, while con-
sumers are persuaded into considering the alternative, they might not buy
it in the end. To see why, suppose that x∗ 6= y  x and m > n. Because
of the latter, a consumer with status quo (y, n) buys y despite considering
(x,m), but the reason why (x,m) is offered is that this strategy protects
demand from consumers with status quo product x from considering y.
Attention-grabbers and product lines In an extension of their baseline
model, Eliaz and Spiegler (2011b) consider the consequences of inertia in
consumer attention for product lines, when certain varieties have the only
goal of grabbing consumers’ attention. Product lines can be thought of
as menus, and consumers have well-defined preferences over menus. For-
mally, X is the set of all possible menu items, and M ∈ P(X) is a menu.
As before, there are two firms simultaneously choosing their menusM,M ′,
and consumer attention features inertia in the sense that otherwise homo-
geneous consumers initially are assigned to a status quo firm. Importantly,
consumers do not necessarily derive utility from all items in a menu. Some
itemsmay be irrelevant to the consumer’s well-being, but neverthelessmat-
ter for consumer choice as they persuade the consumer into considering
the alternative menu. For any menu L(M) ⊂ M denotes the set of content
items in M , i.e. the set of items from M that affect a consumer’s utility.
In this version of their model the consideration function φ is a mapping:
φ : X × P(X) → {0, 1}, (x, L(M)) 7→ φ(x, L(M)), i.e. φ depends on items
rather than on marketing strategies. It should be remarked that this type of
consideration function gives a clear offensive touch to attention-grabbing,
as a firm cannot use attention-grabbers to prevent a consumer from switch-
ing. Moreover, the use of attention-grabbers is assumed to be neutral for
status quo consumers, meaning that pure attention-grabbers can never an-
noy consumers. Menus are quality-ordered in the sense thatM  M ′ im-
34 See Bagwell (2007).
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plies that c(L(M)) > c(L(M ′)), i.e. producing a more preferred menu in-
volves more expensive content items. In the absence of inertial attention,
i.e. if consumer always consider both menus, this means thatM∗ = L(X),
i.e. the most preferred menu is the only menu offered in equilibrium.
The authors now ask how the equilibrium changes if consumer attention
features inertia and certain items may work as pure attention grabbers,
i.e. their only function is to make the consumer consider the alternative
menu. They show that if i) for any set of content items L(M) there exists
an item x such that φ(x, L(M)) = 1, and ii) ∃M such that M∗  M but
f(M∗, L(M)) = {0}, then pure attention grabbers are offered in equilib-
rium with positive probability. Assumption i) means that there always are
items (potentially pure attention grabbers) to attract consumer attention to
the alternative, and ii) means that even if the contender chooses the most
preferredmenu, the status quo firm can select a set of inferior content items
preventing the consumer from considering the alternative.
The intuition why pure attention-grabbers are used in equilibrium is the
following. First, M∗ is not a best response to M∗, because ii) assures that
the defender can select an inferior (i.e. cheaper) menu but prevent the
consumer from considering the alternative, by providing sufficiently many
content items. But if j playsM ≺ M∗, g may have an incentive to playM∗
together with attention-grabbers in order to induce a comparison.
It is important to keep in mind that the result on attention-grabbing with
zero-utility products was derived under the assumption of a purely offen-
sive nature of attention-seeking, where jamming or reducing the competi-
tor’s salience is not possible. Hence attention-grabbing with zero-utility
as a tactic can be successful only if at the same time the own menu is su-
perior to the competitor’s choice, which explains why the model naturally
features only mixed-strategy equilibria (except in the benchmark case of
perfectly rational consumers). It also explains why in their model a menu
of the formM ) M∗ always is chosen with positive probability (necessar-
ily containing pure attention grabbers). In view of limited attention, one
could expect the firms trying to reduce or even abolish comparison of their
products with competing products, conditional on being perceived. This
line of argument is discussed in the next section.
5.2 Obfuscation
Consumer search Besides the theory of informative advertising, mod-
els of consumer search address the problem of scarce information. Per-
haps most well-known is the sequential search model by Stahl (1989). Con-
sumers face an exogenous search cost and hold rational expectations about
the (equilibrium) price distribution. A number of n identical firms offer a
homogeneous product, and simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose
their product prices, holding rational expectations about consumer search
depth. Searching means sampling a particular firm and learning its price.
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Consumers continue to search if the expected benefit of sampling another
firm exceeds the cost of doing so, and purchase at the lowest perceived
price. The probability to perceive an individual firm is exogenous and equal
to 1/n, but howmany firms a consumer samples is potentially complex and
depends on his sample history (and his beliefs).
In terms of our primitives, consumer search means that Xi = Ai. As with
informative advertising Xi ⊂ X is possible. The difference to informative
advertising is that limited consumer information results from incomplete
consumer search rather than from incomplete advertising efforts of firms.
To make the model interesting, a fraction µ ∈ (0, 1) of the unit population
are costless searchers, i.e. they learn each firm’s price for free, the remaining
1− µ consumers must conduct a costly sequential price search.
As firms cannot discriminate between either type of consumer, this gener-
ates informational discrepancies between consumers, which - similar to the
advertising model of Butters (1977) - induces firms to play mixed pricing
strategies. Also, they earn positive (expected) profits, because the costly
searchers do not learn all prices. A prediction of this search model (and
others) is that if consumer search costs decline (or the fraction of costless
searchers increases) this puts downward pressure on prices because the
“threat" that consumers continue to search after sampling a highprice quota
increases.35 If consumer search costs approach zero, the equilibrium con-
verges to the Bertrand equilibrium, i.e. all firms equate prices with unit
costs. Thus lower information costs have pro-competitive effects, which is
similar to the conclusion of informative advertising.
Evidence of obfuscation This prediction stands in stark contrast to a re-
cent piece of evidence on estimated e-commerce markups (Ellison and El-
lison (2009)). In their empirical study, the authors consider the e-market
for computer memory modules on a price comparison website. The web-
site (Pricewatch.com) lists different modules of various companies in an
ascending price order. Hence the cheapest modules get the salient top po-
sitions. One could be lead to think that such a comparison site warrants a
competitive outcome, as search costs for the lowest price are virtually zero,
and salience competition naturally puts downwards pressure on prices in
this environment. The striking finding of the authors is that while demand
for low-quality memory modules is highly price-sensitive, a supplier sells
more (profitable)medium- and high-qualitymodules if its low-qualitymod-
ules occupy a better ranking on the price filter. Hence low-quality memory
modules work as an effective loss-leader.
The authors intuitively explain their finding by consumers in fact clicking
on the salient (top-list) positions much more frequently, but then the link
takes them to the suppliers own website, where the consumer frequently
is confronted with several “bargain offers", persuading him into acquiring
a higher-quality memory module of the same supplier. The authors esti-
35 In fact the equilibrium is such that a costly searcher searches exactly once.
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mate that such an obfuscation strategy of firms implies an effective average
markup of about 12%, while a naive application of demand elasticities only
in case of low-memory modules (the loss leader) would suggest markups
between 3% - 6%. Generally, their findings suggest that both attracting and
retaining (or managing) attention are of fundamental importance to mod-
ern business - and vital for economists and regulators to understand.
A search-cost model of obfuscation Ellison andWolitzky (2012) provide
a formalization of obfuscation bymodifying the sequential searchmodel in
Stahl (1989). Obfuscation is modeled as a firm’s possibility to increase con-
sumer search costs. Search costs are of the form g(τ + tj), where τ > 0 is a
firm-independent exogenously fixed time per search and tj is j’s obfusca-
tion level, i.e. the extra time a consumer requires to learn j’s price. g(·) itself
is strictly convex. Obfuscation times are ex ante unknown to consumers and
do not influence the initial sampling chances (but the propensity to search
on), and consumers hold rational obfuscation expectations. The authors ex-
tensively discuss the case of costless obfuscation.36 This intuitivelymatches
a situation, where a firm decides not to take efforts to ease the evaluation
of their products, e.g. by not attempting to make a product website as in-
formative and transparent as it could be. In this scenario if a consumer
samples an obfuscating firm, obfuscation reduces the propensity of con-
sumers to search, because it increases his future search costs by the con-
vexity of g(·). The authors emphasize an intriguing difference between the
benchmark model, where obfuscation by assumption is not possible, and
the case of costless obfuscation. In both models firms play mixed strategies
with respect to prices, and consumers search exactly once. There are two
types of price distributions in the benchmark case, depending on whether
search costs are high or low. While with high search costs the monopoly
price pm belongs to the equilibrium support and the price distribution does
not change if search costs increase further, the upper bound of the support
is strictly smaller than pm with low search costs, because otherwise con-
sumers would continue to search. The possibility to obfuscate annihilates
the possibility of this second equilibrium, exactly because firms can pre-
vent this second search under a (slightly) higher price by obfuscating, i.e.
increasing consumer search costs. In fact, the equilibrium price distribu-
tion with costless obfuscation corresponds exactly to the price distribution
of the benchmark model with sufficiently high exogenous search costs in-
dependent of the general search cost parameter τ . This means that even if
general information costs decline, which certainly is the case with newme-
dia such as the Internet, this does not automatically foster competition, as
firms might be able to avoid competition by obfuscation.
All in all obfuscation strategies are played by firms in this setting as ob-
fuscation increases a consumer’s time cost required to learn the price of a
36 The model becomes far less tractable, though also richer in terms of possible equilibrium
patterns, if obfuscation is costly for firms.
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product, which diminishes his propensity to search on.37
6 Rational Inattention
In contrast to the previously encountered models of stimulus-driven lim-
ited attention, models of rational inattention concentrate on goal-driven at-
tention allocation processes. As was pointed out in section 1.3, both ap-
proaches essentially differ in how the attention allocation function Pi is de-
termined. While Pi is exogenous to the decision-maker in case of stimulus-
driven attention but endogenous to the model, models of rational inatten-
tion endogenize Pi as an outcome of an attention optimization process.
Anarrative example We illustrate the difference between the two approa-
ches with a simple narrative example. Consider an investor who wishes
to decide on selling or buying some assets. Every morning he receives a
newspaper and must decide howmuch time he devotes to the entire news-
paper, as well as how much of time to allocate to the economics, finance
and politics subsections. Increasing overall reading time tends to reduce
the likelihood of making mistakes in the investment decision due to ig-
nored or misinterpreted information, but also reduces the time available
for other tasks, such as not being late for work. Given that the investor
does not read the entire newspaper, there is the problem of how to allocate
his reading time over the different subsections. For an investment decision
reading the finance section might be most relevant. Nevertheless, reading
the politics or general economics section might also be important since top-
ics such as economic policies, decision on warfare, strikes etc. will be dis-
cussed there, which couldmatter for an investment decision as well. Under
the presumption that the investor has known his newspaper since long, he
might have an ex-ante judgment (“beliefs”) about the information poten-
tial of each section of the particular redaction in his hands. He then may
decide rationally on the allocation of a given amount of time over the sub-
sections, as well as on total reading time, weighting the expected benefits of
the optimal reading strategy against the costs of doing something else. In
contrast, the stimulus-driven approach to attention would emphasize that
fancy headlines, pictures or report framing, may have some impact onwhat
subsections the investor considers, or for how long he reads the newspaper.
37 The authors also explore a version, where obfuscation affects consumers expectations about
future search costs, given that the search time per product is initially unknown and must be
inferred fromobserved search time and prices. In this version the additional problemof excess
obfuscation arises.
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6.1 The two-stage decision problem of
a totally rational agent
Sims (1998, 2003, 2005) was the first to formalize the goal-driven attention
allocation problem, using the entropy from Shannon’s information theory
as the essential measure of informativeness of a channel.38 The approach
of De Oliviera et al. (2013) adds a decision-theoretic foundation to this lit-
erature, which we shall explain briefly.
The model In their setting the agent holds some prior beliefs p¯ about the
true state of the world ω ∈ Ω. An agent can attend to different channels that
provide her with further information (her posterior beliefs) about the real-
ized state. Different channels potentially imply different posteriors p. Based
on the received information the agent chooses an act out of a menu of feasi-
ble acts, i.e. f ∈ F , where f is a mapping associated with the consequence
f(ω) for each state of the world. In our newspaper example, we can think
of the different channels as a reading-time allocation over the subsections,
while f is the investment decision (e.g. buying or selling) depending on the
presumed state of the world. An agent optimally chooses which channels
to observe, with the main goal of obtaining the best possible information
(posteriors) about the state of the world at minimal information costs.
The entire decision problem of an agent can thus be depicted as a two-stage
choice problem. In stage II the agent solves a standard utility maximizing
problem, which gives the optimal action f for a given posterior distribu-
tion p. The objective of stage I is to choose the optimal channel, i.e. the
optimal allocation of her attention, that maximizes her information value,
considering also her subjective attention costs.
Formally, the two-stage decision problem can be summarized as
max
pi∈Π(p¯)

∫
∆(Ω)
max
f∈F
(∫
Ω
u (f(ω)) p(dω)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Stage II
pi(dp)− c(pi)
 (8)
with the utility function on consequences u : X → R, and Π(p¯) as the set of
all channels for a given prior p¯. The subjective information costs c : Π(p¯)→
[0,∞] capture the costs (in terms of utils) associated with each channel.39
In this framework the agent is totally rational in the sense that she optimizes
both over information acquisition and investment actions. Due to the fact
that information is subjectively costly, she will be inattentive to information
that is not promising to be valuable.40
38 A channel can be thought of as a signal that is correlatedwith the state of theworld, which
the decision maker would like to learn
39 In our narrative the costs would depend on the overall reading time and the reading dif-
ficulties of the selected subsections.
40 Most of the modeling on rational inattention focused on a variation of the subjective cost
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6.2 The entropy model: An example
The rational inattention approach has been applied to diverse macroeco-
nomic subfields such as sticky prices (Sims (2003);Woodford (2009)), differ-
ences in the price reactions due to different shocks (Maćkowiak andWieder-
holt (2009); Matejka (2012)), understanding the forward discount puzzle of
the uncovered interest rate parity condition (Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2006)), business cycles (Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009)) and consump-
tion choice with asymmetric responses to wealth shocks (Tutino (2013)).
In finance models of rational inattention have been used to study portfo-
lio allocation decision (Peng (2005)), diversification vanNieuwerbrugh and
Veldkamp (2010), understanding home bias (Mondria et al. (2010)) or sec-
toral instead of firm specific learning (Peng andXiong (2006)). Other papers
investigate rational inattention in the context of coordination games (Hell-
wig andVeldkamp (2009)), or team-production problems (Dessein and San-
tos (2013)).41
Most of the work mentioned above models the information cost function
based on the concept of Shannon capacity,42 sometimes calledmutual infor-
mation I . Mutual information quantifies by howmuch a signal reduces the
uncertainty about the outcome (the entropy) of a random variable. In his
seminal article, Sims (2002) introduces limited attention as an upper bound
κ on mutual information. We now present a simple example of a beauty
contest with rationally inattentive agents as an illustration for a model with
bounded Shannon capacities.43
Rational inattention in the beauty contest There is a unit measure of
agents, indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. Each agent chooses a price pi ∈ R in order
to minimize her loss function
u(pi) = −1
2
(
pi − (1− r)X − r
∫
pidi
)2
(9)
In sloppy terms, an agent wants to choose her price such to minimize the
difference to the (random) state of theworld and to the average price chosen
by the other agents. The parameter r ∈ [−1, 1] quantifies the utility that
arises from the average price of all other agents p¯ =
∫
pidi versus the utility
from an unknown state X . Each agent has beliefs about the state of the
world and about the behavior of the other agents.
Suppose thatX is Gaussianwithmean µ and variance σ2X . The agent learns
about the state of the world in form of a signal si = X + i, where i is a
function c(.), see Veldkamp (2011) or Hellwig et al. (2012) for a discussion on information
choice technologies.
41 Veldkamp (2011) is a comprehensive source of further applications.
42 Recently, some authors have used non entropy-based cost functions, as the Shannon ca-
pacity implies decreasing marginal cost of information, e.g. Pavan (2013) and Veldkamp
(2011).
43 This is a simplified version of Hellwig, Kohls and Veldkamp (2012), also taking advantage
of results fromWiederholt (2010).
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normally-distributed zero-mean observation error with variances σ2 . Thus
X and si have a multivariate normal distribution with conditional variance
σ2X|s. Themutual information contained in signal si about the randomvari-
able X is given by I(X; s) = 12 log2
(
σ2X
σ2
X|s
)
.44 This quantifies the reduction
of uncertainty about the true state of the world by observing signal si.
Limited attention is an upper bound κ on mutual information, i.e. the ca-
pacity constraint is of the form I(X; s) ≤ κ, which means that
σ2X
σ2
≤ 4κ − 1. (10)
Selecting an attention allocation essentially means deciding on the size of
the noiseσ2 or, equivalently, choosing the precision of the information about
the unknown stateX . By doing so, she faces a cost τ for each unit κ of bits.
The complete decision problem with rational inattention can be described
by:
min
κ≥0
E
(
−1
2
(
p∗i − (1− r)X − r
∫
pidi
)2
− τκ
)
(11)
with respect to the information capacity constraint (10) and optimal pricing
strategy
p∗i = argmin
pi
E
(
−1
2
(
pi − (1− r)X − r
∫
pidi
)2 ∣∣∣si) (12)
This problem can be simplified in several steps. At first, following Hellwig,
Kohls and Veldkamp (2012) one can represent the expected utility (11) of
an agent who acts optimally when choosing the price pi with the indirect
utility function
E(u) = −1
2
r2V ar(p¯|si)− r(1− r)Cov(p¯, X|si)− 1
2
(1− r)2V ar(X|si)− τκ
(13)
When choosing the optimal information structure, the agent is only con-
cerned about reducing the expected variance of his optimal action. There-
fore it is enough to consider the implications of the information structure
for the conditional variance of the state X , the conditional variance of the
average action p¯ and the covariance between both. Secondly, the solution
to the optimal pricing problem (12) can be derived by assuming that each
agents optimal price can be represented as a linear combination of themean
µ of the true state X and the individually received signal si
pi = (1− γ)µ+ γsi (14)
44 For a detailed derivation see Cover (2002).
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implying an expected average action of p¯ = (1−γ¯)µwith γ = (1−r) σ2X
σ2X+σ
2

+
γ¯r being the weight on the private signal of the agent. For simplicity we
consider only symmetric information choices, i.e. in equilibrium the agents
will choose the same precisions of the signal and thus the same action rules,
which nevertheless allows for ex-post different received signals and there-
fore different actions. Then, the attention allocation (11) becomes:
E(u) = −1
2
[rγ + (1− r)]2 σ
2
σ
2
X
σ2X + σ
2

− τκ (15)
subject to the information constraint (10). Solving this decision problem
one gets as optimal bits to process κ∗:
κ∗ =
{
1
2 log2
σ2X [rγ+(1−r)]2ln2
τ if
σ2X [rγ+(1−r)]2ln2
τ ≥ 1
0 otherwise
(16)
Expression (16) means the following. Suppose that an agent currently pays
no attention to the state of the world (κ = 0). This is not optimal if his
marginal utility of attention about X , σ2X [rγ + (1− r)]2 ln2, is larger than
the marginal cost of information processing τ . Then, the agent is going to
allocate attention towards observing the real state. The marginal utility of
attention depends positively on state variance σ2X , which is intuitive as the
higher the variance σ2X , the more valuable reducing uncertainty about X
and avoiding mistakes becomes. It also depends negatively on the strength
of the coordinationmotive r. Themore important the actions of other agents
are, the less important the precision of her private about X becomes. That
is, her optimal κ decreases as our agent keeps track of the real stateX with
more noise.45 Allowing for higher noise also means that she will put even
less weight on her private signal since γ = γ¯ = σ
2
X
σ2X+σ
2

when deciding on
her optimal pricing (14).
In sum, an increase of the coordination motive means that the agent will
rely more on the commonly known prior µ, and allocate less attention to
privately learning the true state. However, this tendency towards common
information is reinforced by the fact that agents take into account the at-
tention allocation of other agents which, as Hellwig and Veldkamp (2009)
show, with complementarity may destroy the standard uniqueness results
for this class of games. The discussed example illustrates that the attention
allocation reflects the forces of the underlying game, meaning that if an
agent wants to coordinate with the action of others, she has to know what
the others know. This means that private information about the state of the
world is less important.
45 This means a higher σ2 by the capacity constraint (10), which is binding, i.e. κ =
1
2
log2
(
σ2X
σ2
)
.
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7 Conclusion
The allocation of scarce resources is a main theme in economics. In an
information-rich society consisting of agents with finite mental capacities,
attention naturally becomes a scarce resource, but one that is far less tangi-
ble than a conventional monetary budget constraint. Therefore, it is a cen-
tral task for economics as an academic discipline to explore and research
the causes and consequences of this special type of scarcity for market out-
come and welfare.
In this article we presented a simple framework describing the allocation
of limited attention, and we used this framework to organize and discuss a
number of recent economics contributions on attention.
One important separating line is whether attention follows a goal-driven or
a stimulus-driven process. Given that constrained optimization has been a
central tool used by economists to micro-found the allocation of scarce re-
sources by individual decision-makers, it may be less surprising that the
larger part of the literature on attention has focused on goal-driven atten-
tion allocation. As is voiced in the corresponding catchword of “rational
inattention”, this strand of the literature takes into account individual pro-
cessing capacity limitations and the resulting attention allocation problem,
but presumes that what is ignored and what considered is under complete
control of the decision-maker. This requires that the agents are aware of
what theymiss, as only then they can consciously decide not to look at some
alternatives. Hence the agents must be endowed with ex-ante information
about the values and the likelihoods of the possible alternatives, and it is
usually left open by these models where this prior knowledge (which is
usually assumed to be “correct” in equilibrium) comes from.
While the goal-driven approach to (in)attention is important in terms of the
theoretical benchmark it creates, it rules out the possibility of heteronomous
or manipulative influences. Given the substantial evidence from different
fields such as Psychology, Marketing or Internet research, documenting
that and how external instances influence perception, this seems incom-
plete at best when trying to understand observed behavior. For example,
a standard model of rational inattention has great difficulties to account
for obfuscation, since rational agent would learn about such strategies and
avoid e.g. misguided information links on the web.
One criticism against abandoning that subjects have the sovereign power
over their mental resources is, that one trades a crystal-clear decision ma-
chinery against a plethora of possible attention mechanisms (entering into
the wilderness of bounded rationality). Nevertheless, the empirical evi-
dence suggests that the alternative road of sender-driven attention alloca-
tion needs to be taken, and the models presented in this article show that
a rigorous theoretical assessment of the matter is possible. We believe that
the existing theories and insights form a substantial starting point, but fur-
ther research is required to uncover the attentional edge of the digital age.
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